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Ili January 196:

MEMORANDEM FOR: Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.

The Director of Intelligence and Research

Decertment of State

SUBJECT:

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Ambassador

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lowing views on world problems:

"The Soviet Government -- I mean Khrushchev --wents a talk with Kennedy. I'm told he said so during that long meeting in Moseow and he certainly told it to Gosmika. I don't believe he feels that he can settle all the problems between you with a talk. What I would say he wants is to get some impotus behind a disarrament agreement and also to prove that this new administration of yours is willing to do business with him.

"The Russians don't really know anything about Kennedy. They are trying to find every smidgeon of information they can about him and how he thinks. This they have as smbassador in Washington is being comical in the way he tries to find out. But he has his orders. So, he goes about it the only way he knows how to do it.

"I don't know much about the fighting in Lacs. It seems to me that you put money on wrong horses again. Yes, you say that you expected me to say that. The point is that the Russians want some way of extracting themselves from out there, too. It isn't easy for the Russians to pump in military aid into Laos right on the Chinese doorstep. Had they refused you would have certainly seen Chinese aid, demonstrably delivered; maybe along with their 'volunteers'. If the Russians didn't show their presence, they would have certainly been accused of having violated the Mosocw all-party declaration on helping out revolutions. To me, this means they go to the brink but not over it.

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"Your idea is that most of this alarm about Chinese intentions is phoney. I refer to intentions that call for 'going for broke', as we used to say. I believe it. They have a let less to lose under present circumstances than anyone else. Try to look at this pragmatically. You are not going to submit to a Soviet disamment plan. Any such agreement -- hard as it is to work out -- will have to be with some kind of compresses. That's also the way it's going to be with the muclear test-ban negotiations. These agreements, if they come, won't change your minds about the Russians and vice-versa. Then will be a chance for both of you to regulate lete of other countries with the epportunity to become so-called nuclear powers. Sure, it stops the Germans; but it also stops the Chinese. The Chinese, by the way, have a strange outlook on neutral countries. They see the need for Hesser's revolution to be replaced by another revolution. They also say that the Soudan is really more constitted than uncound thed. They also seid -- in Mosecy -- that Nehra was running a capitalist society.

"At the moment, I think it looks pretty certain for Khrushshev to go to the UK in March, when it resumes session. He'd go, I believe, to try and have an opportunity to see Kennedy, by hook or crock. He doesn't embarrass, as you know, and it also would show in a propagands may that he will do anything to seek peace. I would say that the results of the feelers put out by the Russians and the beginnings of the resumed nuclear test talks will make up Khrushchev's mind for him.

"As for us? We will stay on the Khrashchev line, as you call it. There are so dammed many problems we have at home that we cannot get involved in too many outside questions. It's all out of our hands, in any case. We cannot do even a part of what the United Kingdom can do to try to persuade you or alter your opinions. There will probably be one thing that we will carry out: If there is no sign of any improvement in your relations with the Russians, we'll probably be the genial hosts for a Warsew Fact meeting that gives a separate treaty to East Germany.

"I, personally, do not believe that Khrushchev is terribly keen on such a treaty. It exects too many

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complications, for him as well. Ho matter what you may think, I am pretty convinced that he has no stars in his eyes about the East Germans and certainly not Ulbricht. But Ulbricht is a very useful guy; so he is used."

> Richard Helms Acting Deputy Director (Plans)

RHelms/ecd - 14/1/61

cc: DCI
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